The case of former Bolingbrook, Illinois, police
officer Drew Peterson is troubling in many respects, not the least of which is
the fact that not one but two
of Mr. Peterson’s former wives died and/or went missing under suspicious
circumstances. But Mr. Peterson’s conviction for the murder of his third wife,
Kathleen Savio, is also troubling in that it was based in no small part on
questionable hearsay testimony; specifically, witnesses were allowed
to testify to statements allegedly made by both Savio and Peterson’s fourth
wife, Stacy Peterson, who is missing and presumed dead.
Today, though, was not the day to address the legal
issues arising out of Mr. Peterson’s conviction. Those issues will be
addressed, as they should be, on appeal. Rather, today was the day Drew
Peterson was to be sentenced on a conviction that, for now, has to be considered
perfectly valid. And he
was sentenced – to thirty-eight years in prison, including credit for the
four years he’s served to date. Peterson will have to serve every one of the
remaining thirty-four years he has coming, which means he won’t be released
until he’s 93 years old.
Nonetheless, Peterson’s sentencing, like so many
aspects of his case, is troubling, too. That’s because, according
to the Chicago Tribune:
Peterson had faced as
much as 60 years, but Judge Edward Burmila said he gave Peterson some
consideration for his years as a police officer and his service in the
military.
Let me stop here for a moment and interject the
obvious: I wasn’t at the sentencing hearing, and the Tribune article provides little more by way of an
explanation for the Judge’s sentencing decision. So there may be more to it
than that.
But if the Tribune accurately characterized the basis of Judge
Burmila’s decision not to impose a longer sentence, the decision itself is
rather disconcerting. First, Peterson expressed no remorse; instead, the
Tribune says, “he screamed,
‘I did not kill Kathleen!’,” and launched into a bizarre diatribe in which he
attacked the investigation, his prosecutors, and the criminal justice system as
a whole. I’m not a criminal lawyer, but it’s axiomatic that a convicted
defendant will ordinarily receive a harsher sentence if he refuses to
acknowledge his guilt and apologize for what he’s done – even if he intends to
appeal the underlying conviction.
Second, it’s puzzling, to say the least, that the
Judge “gave
Peterson some consideration for his years as a police officer.” Note that
this is not a case where an individual served as a police officer years ago,
then committed a crime later in life after having left the force. Peterson was
convicted of killing Savio while he was serving as a police officer. You would think that committing murder while
you’re a police officer would
actually make matters worse, not better.
You’d think that, and you’d be right – at least,
according to the law. In Illinois, judges sentencing criminal defendants to
prison time are supposed to consider a series of mitigating and aggravating
factors that are set out in Sections 5-5-3.1 and 5-5-3.2, respectively, of the
Unified Code of Corrections. See
730
ILCS 5/5-5-3.1, 5-5-3.2. You will search Section 5-5-3.1 in vain to find
“being a police officer” listed among the mitigating factors a judge is
supposed to consider. You will, however, find that the judge is supposed to
consider whether “[t]he character and attitudes of the defendant indicate that
he is unlikely to commit another crime” (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.1(a)(9)) – which is
why showing remorse is considered to be so important.
On the other hand, you’ll also find, among the
aggravating factors that may lead a judge to lengthen a sentence, the
following:
[Whether] the defendant,
by the duties of his office or by his position, was obliged to prevent the
particular offense committed or to bring the offenders committing it to justice
…
730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a)(6). That provision doesn’t
mean a police officer who commits a crime should automatically be sentenced
more harshly than another individual who commits the same crime, but it does
mean that when an police officer violates the trust the public puts in him, the
court should at least consider whether that merits a harsher sentence.
Here, the jury found that Peterson committed murder
– one of the crimes he’s supposed to prevent – at a time when he was a police
officer. And, of course, being a police officer put Peterson in a position to
cover his tracks, and possibly to influence the outcome of the initial
investigation into Savio’s murder. We’ll probably never know why
that investigation went awry, but there’s little doubt that when a police
officer murders his wife, or anyone else for that matter, he violates the
public trust in the worst possible way.
So it’s hard to understand why the fact that
Peterson was a police officer should weigh in his favor in the sentencing
decision.
Of course, as a practical matter, it may make
little or no difference whether Peterson was sentenced to 38 years or the full
60 years permitted under the law. He’ll probably die in prison anyway. But the
larger issue here is whether there is a separate legal standard that benefits
police officers when they commit crimes and thereby violate the public trust.
And given a handful of notorious cases in the Chicago area over the past few
years, it’s not unreasonable to ask whether such a double standard exists.
In addition to Peterson, there was the case of Anthony
Abbate, who received two years probation after viciously beating Karolina
Obrycka in a bar in 2007 – a sentence many of us felt was exceedingly light
under the circumstances. But at least Abbate was convicted of aggravated
battery in that case; in 2009 a judge acquitted
Chicago Police Officers Paul Powers and Gregory Barnes and Sgt. Jeffery Planey
of aggravated battery in connection with a brawl outside another tavern, a
decision that raised more than a few eyebrows here. And then there was this
case from August 2010:
When off-duty Chicago
Police Officer John Ardelean, 36, was involved in a suspected DUI accident on
Thanksgiving that killed two people — Miguel Flores, 22, and Erick Lagunas, 21
— he was not arrested immediately after the crash or at the hospital. Instead,
a police Lt. John Magruder ordered him arrested hours after the crash when he
smelled alcohol on the officer. An judge has now thrown out the charges due to
a lack of probable cause.
Of course, each of these cases has to be evaluated
on its own merits, but when incident after incident occurs in which it appears
as though police officers charged with serious offenses – murder, aggravated
battery, DUI that results in fatalities – are given particularly lenient
treatment in comparison to non-officer offenders charged with similar crimes,
the courts have an obligation to address the growing distrust the public feels
in the administration of justice. Maybe there is a rational explanation for the
results in each of those cases, but you can’t fault the public for perceiving
the existence of a double standard that protects cops gone bad.
At a minimum, I would think that Drew Peterson’s
judge would have wanted to avoid adding to that perception today.

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